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I.

INTRODUCTION

A Class III medical device, by definition, “support[s] or
sustain[s] human life” or “presents a potential unreasonable risk of
1
illness or injury.” As a result, the decision to authorize the sale of
Class III devices through the premarket approval process requires a

†
David Schultz is a trial lawyer and partner at Maslon Edelman Borman &
Brand, LLP, where he focuses his practice on high stakes litigation. David’s trial
experience in product liability, personal injury, and wrongful death cases is
extensive, dating back to his time as an Assistant Minnesota Attorney General
where he defended the state in such matters. In private practice, he has
successfully represented a broad range of companies in complex litigation and
currently acts as national counsel for a large medical device manufacturer.
†† Scott Aberson is an attorney at Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP.
He represents business entities, major manufacturers, and individuals in complex
commercial litigation in the areas of tort and product liability, intellectual
property litigation, and general business litigation.
Scott has successfully
represented both plaintiffs and defendants in multiple state and federal
jurisdictions across the country.
1. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2006).
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difficult
and
time-consuming
cost-benefit
analysis—i.e.,
“weigh[ing] any probable benefit to health from the use of the
2
device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use.”
Congress placed exclusive responsibility for conducting this costbenefit analysis of medical devices in the hands of the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”). If the FDA determines the benefits
of the device outweigh its risks, the device is deemed to be safe and
effective. To ensure manufacturers are not subjected to a standard
of care inconsistent with, or additional to, those imposed by the
FDA, Congress explicitly preempted any conflicting or additional
state requirements related to the safety and effectiveness of a
3
device.
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
clarified that, for devices receiving premarket approval, state
common-law claims or causes of action, such as negligence and
strict liability, impose “addition[al]” requirements related to the
“safety or effectiveness of the device” and are therefore expressly
4
preempted by § 360k(a). In the years since Riegel was decided,
courts across the country have broadly enforced this statutory
prohibition and dismissed all manner of claims that seek to impose
5
requirements that are “different from, or in addition to” the
standards imposed by the FDA.
In an attempt to survive
preemption, plaintiffs in some medical device cases have attempted
to separate out the allegedly defective aspect or component parts of
a premarket approved medical device, arguing the FDA somehow
limited its premarket approval to only certain aspects or
components of a particular medical device or system. Several
courts have now addressed the issue, appropriately rejecting this
argument and concluding that premarket approval applies to the
entire device or system. Not to be deterred, plaintiffs in medical
device cases have filed citizen petitions with the FDA, requesting
that the FDA “clarify” its approval letters to limit the scope of the
premarket approval (“PMA”) to only certain components of the
6
medical devices. The FDA’s denials of these requests to amend its
approval letters coupled with its assurances it had indeed approved
2. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 318 (2008) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(2)(C)).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
4. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–27 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a)).
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1).
6. See, e.g., Duggan v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 466, 472 (D. Mass.
2012); Bentzley v. Medtronic, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
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the entire systems demonstrates that, consistent with judicial
precedent, there is simply no such thing as a limited PMA.
This article begins by discussing the statutory and regulatory
7
background related to the regulation of medical devices. Next, it
8
addresses the approval processes for Class III medical devices. Part
IV of this article provides a brief history of preemption under the
9
Medical Device Act. Part V of this article examines recent court
decisions holding that premarket approval of medical devices
applies to all aspects and components of the medical device
system—i.e., that attempting to separate the component parts of a
medical device system for purposes of preemption is not
10
appropriate.
Finally, this article discusses the FDA’s recent
denials of plaintiffs’ citizen petitions in medical device cases as
evidence that the FDA intends premarket approval to apply to an
11
entire medical device.
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
12

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) has
long required the FDA to approve the introduction of new drugs
13
into the market.
But unlike the situation with new drugs, for
many years the FDA generally lacked authority to regulate the
introduction of new medical devices; instead, “the introduction of
new medical devices was left largely for the States to supervise as
14
they saw fit.”
That all changed when Congress enacted the
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 331–397 (2006)).
13. Riegel v. Medronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008). In Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, the United States Supreme Court explained that “Congress’ first significant
enactment in the field of public health was the Food and Drug Act of 1906,” which
the Court described as “a broad prohibition against the manufacture or shipment
in interstate commerce of any adulterated or misbranded food or drug.” 518 U.S.
470, 475 (1996). Congress subsequently broadened the scope of the 1906 Act “to
include misbranded or adulterated medical devices and cosmetics.” Id.
14. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 315; see also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475 (“While the FDCA
provided for premarket approval of new drugs . . . it did not authorize any control
over the introduction of new medical devices . . . .”). Many states adopted laws
and regulations governing medical devices. See Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler,
The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic,
64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 703 n.66 (1997) (identifying thirteen state statutes governing
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15

Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”), “which swept back
some state obligations” and expanded the FDA’s authority to
16
regulate medical devices.
The MDA established three regulatory classes of medical
devices, with varying levels of oversight depending on the risks the
17
devices in each class present and the “level of control necessary to
18
Class I
assure the safety and effectiveness of the device[s].”
medical devices pose the lowest risk and are therefore subject to
the lowest level of government oversight: “general controls,” such
as labeling requirements and generally applicable design and
19
manufacturing standards. Class II medical devices are devices that
cannot be classified as Class I devices because the “general
controls” applicable to all devices “are insufficient to provide [a]
20
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.”
Thus, while Class II devices may be marketed without advance
21
approval, these devices are subject to “special controls,” such as
performance standards, postmarket surveillance measures, and
22
development and dissemination of guidelines. Class III devices
medical devices when the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 was enacted).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
16. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316. The FDA’s expanded authority as it relates to
medical devices was due, in part, to advances in medical technologies and
consumer and regulatory concerns over injuries that resulted from such devices:
As technologies advanced and medicine relied to an increasing degree
on a vast array of medical equipment “[f]rom bedpans to brainscans,”
including kidney dialysis units, artificial heart valves, and heart
pacemakers, policymakers and the public became concerned about the
increasingly severe injuries that resulted from the failure of such devices.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475–76 (citations omitted) (quoting SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., MEDICAL
DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA’S NEGLECTED CHILD 1 (Comm. Print 1983)).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316; see also Classify Your
Medical Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm (last
updated Dec. 3, 2012) (“[C]lassification is risk based, that is, the risk the device
poses to the patient and/or the user is a major factor in the class it is assigned.”).
18. Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 17 (stating that medical devices are
assigned to one of three classes “based on the level of control necessary to assure
the safety and effectiveness of the device”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360c. According to
the FDA’s website, it has established classifications for approximately 1700
different generic types of devices. Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 17.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316; Classify Your Medical
Device, supra note 17.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
21. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477.
22. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316–17.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/4

4

Schultz and Aberson: Be Careful What You Ask For: The FDA's Denials of Citizen Petitio

2013]

FDA’S DENIALS OF CITIZEN PETITIONS

1161
23

have the greatest risk and receive the most federal oversight. In
general, a medical device is assigned to Class III if neither general
nor special controls would provide a “reasonable assurance of its
safety and effectiveness,” and the device “is purported or
represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life
or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing
impairment of human health” or “presents a potential
24
unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”
III. CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICE APPROVAL
Class III medical devices “incur the FDA’s strictest regulation”
25
and must receive FDA approval before they may be sold. The
FDA has two different processes by which it approves new Class III
medical devices. Most devices are approved based on applications
26
urging “substantial equivalence” to pre-existing medical devices,
27
commonly known as the § 510(k) process. Alternatively, medical
devices may be approved through the FDA’s premarket approval
28
process, a rigorous process that requires a manufacturer to submit
29
Specifically, the
what is typically a multivolume application.
23. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317; Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 17.
24. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
25. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 343 (2001)
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(II)); see also Medical Devices: Premarket
Approval
(PMA),
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda
.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice
/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm (last modified Jan.
24, 2012) [hereinafter Premarket Approval] (describing Class III as “the most
stringent regulatory category for medical devices”).
26. Pre-existing medical devices are those that were already on the market
when the 1976 Medical Device Amendments were enacted.
27. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317. The § 510(k) process
“imposes a limited form of review on every manufacturer intending to market a
new device by requiring it to submit a ‘premarket notification’ to the FDA.”
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996). If the FDA concludes the medical
“device is ‘substantially equivalent’ to a pre-existing device, it can be marketed
without further regulatory analysis.” Id. The § 510(k) process stems from
Congress’ concerns about both preventing manufacturers of grandfathered
medical devices—i.e., pre-1976 devices that were allowed to remain on the market
without FDA approval due to concerns about the impact of withdrawing those
devices from the market while the FDA completed premarket approval—from
monopolizing the market while new devices await premarket approval, and
ensuring that improvements to existing devices can be rapidly introduced into the
market. Id. at 477–78.
28. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
29. See id.; see also Premarket Approval, supra note 25 (“PMA is the most
stringent type of device marketing application required by FDA. The applicant
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application for premarket approval must contain, among other
things, “full reports of all information” concerning investigations of
the device’s safety and effectiveness that have been “published or
[are] known to or which should reasonably be known to the
applicant”; a “full statement” of the device’s “components,
ingredients, and properties and of the principle or principles of
operation”; “a full description of the methods used in, and the
facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and,
when relevant, packing and installation of, such device”; samples or
device components required by the FDA; and “specimens of the
30
labeling proposed to be used for such device.”
The FDA spends several hundred hours reviewing each PMA
31
application, “weig[hing] any probable benefit to health from the
use of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from
32
such use.”
If the FDA is not satisfied with the information
provided, it may request additional relevant data from the
33
It also may refer the application to a panel of
manufacturer.
34
outside experts. The FDA’s review also includes an evaluation of
the device’s proposed labeling for purposes of evaluating the
device’s safety and effectiveness under the conditions of use set
35
forth on the label, as well as a determination that the device’s
36
proposed labeling is neither false nor misleading.
After completing its review, the FDA must issue an order either
37
granting or denying premarket approval.
The FDA “grants
premarket approval only if it finds there is a ‘reasonable assurance’
38
of the device’s ‘safety and effectiveness.’” In addition, the FDA
must receive FDA approval of its PMA application prior to marketing the device.”).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1).
31. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318 (“The FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours
reviewing each application.”). By contrast, the § 510(k) review is, on average,
completed in just 20 hours. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 479.
32. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C)). It is because
of this balancing test that the FDA may “approve devices that present great risks if
they nonetheless offer great benefits in light of available alternatives.” Id.
33. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(G)).
34. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2007)).
35. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(B)).
36. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(A)).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). Although FDA regulations provide
that the FDA’s order must be issued within 180 days after the FDA’s receipt of a
premarket approval application, the FDA’s review time is typically longer. Id.;
Premarket Approval, supra note 25.
38. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)). If the FDA
determines it cannot approve the medical device’s design, manufacturing
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may “condition approval on adherence to performance
39
standards,” “restrictions upon sale or distribution, or compliance
40
with other requirements.”
It may also “impose device-specific
41
restrictions by regulation.”
The FDA’s regulation of medical devices does not end with
granting the PMA application. “Once a device has received
premarket approval, the MDA forbids the manufacturer to make,
without FDA permission, changes in design specifications,
manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other attribute, that
42
would affect safety or effectiveness.” If a manufacturer wishes to
make changes—e.g., altering an existing device or developing and
manufacturing a next-generation version of an existing device—the
manufacturer must submit an application for supplemental
premarket approval and may implement the changes only after the
43
FDA grants that approval.
An application for supplemental
premarket approval is evaluated under the same exacting criteria as
44
Moreover, the entire PMA submission,
an initial application.
including all prior supplements, are “before” the FDA “at the time
45
the supplement is reviewed.”
methods, or labeling in its proposed form, “it may send an ‘approvable letter’
indicating that the device could be approved if the applicant submitted specified
information or agreed to certain conditions or restrictions.” Id. at 319 (citing 21
C.F.R. § 814.44(e)). “Alternatively, the agency may send a ‘not approvable’ letter,
listing the grounds that justify denial and, where practical, measures that the
applicant could undertake to make the device approvable.” Id. (citing 21 C.F.R.
§ 814.44(f)). “The FDA thus has quite broad authority to approve, deny, and
effectuate modifications of an application throughout the PMA process.” Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Medical devices are subject to
various reporting requirements after receiving premarket approval, including: (1)
“the obligation to inform the FDA of new clinical investigations or scientific
studies concerning the device which the applicant knows of or reasonably should
know of”; and (2) the obligation to “report incidents in which the device may have
caused or contributed to death or serious injury, or malfunctioned in a manner
that would likely cause or contribute to death or serious injury if it recurred.”
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.84(b)(2), 803.50(a)). “The FDA has
the power to withdraw premarket approval based on newly reported data or
existing information and must withdraw approval if it determines that a device is
unsafe or ineffective under the conditions in its labeling.” Id. at 319–20 (citing 21
U.S.C. § 360e(e)(1)).
39. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 861.1(b)(3)).
40. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 814.82).
41. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1)).
42. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i)).
43. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(c)).
44. Id.
45. Premarket Approval of Medical Devices, 51 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,354 (July
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IV. PREEMPTION UNDER THE MEDICAL DEVICE ACT
The MDA includes an express preemption provision in § 360k
that provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no
State or political subdivision of a State may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for
human use any requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the
device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device under this
46
chapter.
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the United States Supreme Court
held that state common-law tort claims involving medical devices
that receive FDA approval through the § 510(k) process are not
47
preempted by § 360k of the MDA. But in doing so, the Court
declined to conclude that common-law duties are never
“requirements” within the meaning of § 360k and that the statute
48
thus could never preempt common-law actions. That is, the Court
22, 1986) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 814) (quoting supplementary
information not transferred to the Code of Federal Regulations).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). The exception contained in subsection (b) states:
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity
for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under
such conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement
of such State or political subdivision applicable to a device intended for
human use if—
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this
chapter which would be applicable to the device if an exemption
were not in effect under this subsection; or
(2) the requirement—
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to
be in violation of any applicable requirement under this
chapter.
Id. § 360k(b).
47. 518 U.S. 470, 495–96 (1996).
48. Id. at 502–03 (“[W]e do not respond directly to this argument . . . .
[S]ince none of the [plaintiffs’] claims is pre-empted in this suit, we need not
resolve hypothetical cases that may arise in the future. . . . Until such a case arises,
we see no need to determine whether the statute explicitly pre-empts such a
claim.”).
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left open the question of whether § 360k preempts state commonlaw tort claims regarding medical devices receiving premarket
approval, as opposed to those devices that were approved through
49
the § 510(k) process.
Following Lohr, the majority of circuits
addressing this question held that common-law tort claims
involving medical devices receiving premarket approval are
50
preempted.
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
51
clarified how this preemption provision is to be applied. First, a
court must determine whether the FDA has established
requirements applicable to the particular medical device in
52
question. The Court in Riegel held that the premarket approval
process does impose certain federal “requirements” upon the
subject medical devices because “the FDA may grant premarket
approval only after it determines that a device offers a reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness” and because “the FDA
requires a device that has received premarket approval to be made
with almost no deviations from the specifications in its approval
53
application.”
Therefore, for all devices receiving premarket
54
approval, this first prong is met.
Second, for those devices that undergo the PMA process, a
49. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2006).
50. See id.; Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 2004); Brooks
v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc.,
254 F.3d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 2001); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 218 (6th
Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1997). But see
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999).
51. 552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008). In Riegel, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York alleging
that a balloon catheter marketed by defendant for use in coronary angioplasty
procedures—which had received FDA premarket approval—was designed, labeled,
and manufactured in a manner that violated New York common law, and that
these defects caused plaintiff to suffer injuries. Id. at 320. “The District Court
held that the MDA pre-empted [plaintiff’s] claims of strict liability; breach of
implied warranty; and negligence in the design, testing, inspection, distribution,
labeling, marketing, and sale of the catheter . . . .” Id. at 312. Accordingly, the
district court dismissed these claims. See id. at 321. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s strict liability; breach of implied warranty; and
negligent design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale
claims. Riegel, 451 F.3d at 106.
52. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321.
53. Id. at 322–23.
54. See id. The Court distinguished devices approved through the less
rigorous § 510(k) process, which have not undergone review for safety or efficacy
under the MDA, but instead are simply reviewed for equivalence. Id. at 323.
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court must then determine whether the plaintiff’s state law claims
impose “requirement[s]” that are “‘different from, or in addition
to’ federal requirements and that ‘relate[] to the safety or
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a
55
requirement applicable to the device.’”
The Court concluded
that the state tort claims for negligence and strict liability at issue in
Riegel met the second part of this test because the claims imposed
“requirements” additional to those federally imposed through the
56
PMA process.
The Court noted, however, that “parallel” state
claims, or those that simply provide a damages remedy for claims
premised on a violation of federal regulations but do not add to
57
federal requirements, are not preempted by § 360k.
Since Riegel, “courts across the country have applied
[§] 360k(a) broadly,” preempting claims ranging from strict
products liability and negligence to breach of warranty, failure to
warn and manufacturing and design defect, and negligence per
58
Nonetheless, parties embroiled in medical device litigation
se.
55. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)).
56. Id. at 323–24.
57. Id. at 330.
58. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp.
2d 1147, 1152 (D. Minn. 2009); see also, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634
F.3d 1296, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding claims for “strict liability for
manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn” and “concerning liability for
negligent design, manufacture and assembly” preempted); Littlebear v. Advanced
Bionics, LLC, No. 11-cv-418-GKF-PJC, 2012 WL 6632477, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 19,
2012) (holding claims for “fraud by nondisclosure” preempted); Tillman v. Smith
& Nephew, Inc., No. 12 C 4977, 2012 WL 6681698, at *1, *3 (D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2012)
(granting motion to dismiss because “negligence, strict liability and breach of
warranty of merchantability” claims were preempted); McClelland v. Medtronic,
Inc., No. 6:11-CV-1444-Orl-36KRS, 2012 WL 5077401, at *4, *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27,
2012) (granting motion to dismiss negligence per se and failure to warn claims
based on MDA preemption); Haynes v. Cyberonics, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-2700-JEC,
2011 WL 3903238, at *5–9 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2011) (holding strict liability, failure
to warn, design and manufacturing defect, and breach of warranty claims
preempted by MDA); Bass v. Stryker Corp., No. 4:09-CV-632-Y, 2010 WL 3431637,
at *1, *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010) (holding claims for products liability,
negligence, breach of implied and express warranties, and statutory fraud
preempted by MDA); Poole v. Hologic, Inc., No. 10-314, 2010 WL 3021528, at *1,
*6 (W.D. La. July 29, 2010) (holding claims for defective design, defective
manufacture, failure to warn, express warranty, and implied warranty preempted
by MDA); Anthony v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:09-cv-2343, 2010 WL 1387790, at *1, *5
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010) (holding claim for manufacturing defect preempted by
MDA); Rankin v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 09-177-KSF, 2010 WL 672135, at *1, *4
(E.D. Ky. Feb. 19, 2010) (holding claims for negligent design and manufacture
preempted by MDA); Funk v. Stryker Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524, 532 (S.D.
Tex. 2009) (holding claims for design defect, manufacturing defect, failure to

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/4

10

Schultz and Aberson: Be Careful What You Ask For: The FDA's Denials of Citizen Petitio

2013]

FDA’S DENIALS OF CITIZEN PETITIONS

1167

continue to dispute the extent to which state common-law tort
claims involving medical devices that received premarket approval
are preempted, with much of plaintiffs’ efforts focused on avoiding
preemption by demonstrating the state claims being asserted are
59
“parallel.”
V. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS HOLD THAT PREMARKET APPROVAL
OF MEDICAL DEVICES APPLIES TO ALL ASPECTS AND
COMPONENTS OF THE DEVICE
Despite the significant attention still being paid to the issue of
60
“parallel” claims, some plaintiffs recently have attempted to avoid
preemption by separating out the allegedly defective aspect or
component of the medical device at issue and arguing that a
different preemption analysis should apply to that particular aspect
or component. This argument arises most often in cases involving
a medical device or system where certain components of the device

warn, and statutory fraud preempted by MDA); Covert v. Stryker Corp., No.
1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *1, *8 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009) (holding claims
for failure to warn, defective design, defective manufacture, negligence, express
warranty, and implied warranty preempted by MDA); Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F.
Supp. 2d 769, 780–89 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding claims for failure to warn,
manufacturing defect, implied warranty, express warranty, misrepresentation, and
fraud preempted by MDA); Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 282–87
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding claims for negligence, defective design, manufacturing
defect, failure to warn, express warranty, and implied warranty preempted by
MDA); Clark v. Medtronic, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093–95 (D. Minn. 2008)
(holding claims for negligence and failure to warn preempted by MDA) ; Blanco v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566, 578–82 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding
claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty preempted by
MDA); Colombini v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., No. 11101/2002, 2009
WL 2170230, at *1, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 6, 2009) (holding claims for negligent
design, negligent manufacture, negligent failure to warn, breach of warranty, and
strict products liability preempted by MDA).
59. See James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, (New) Medical Device
Preemption Scorecard, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Aug. 21, 2008, 7:00 AM),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-medical-device-preemption
-scorecard.html (cataloguing and describing post-Riegel medical device
preemption decisions). See generally J. David Prince, The Puzzle of Parallel Claims,
Preemption, and Pleading the Particulars, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1034 (2013)
(discussing the nature of parallel claims and identifying unresolved issues related
to preemption).
60.
See, e.g., Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (holding negligence claim based on alleged failure to report to the FDA
known risks associated with medical device was not preempted by § 360k of the
MDA because the state-law duty of care “parallels” a federal-law duty imposed by
the MDA).
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or system (or predecessor device components) were initially
approved through the separate § 510(k) process.
For example, in Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., plaintiff received an
artificial hip replacement system manufactured by defendant on or
61
about November 15, 2006. The hip replacement system, called a
Howmedica Osteonics Trident System (“Trident System”),
consisted of several components, including an Osteonics Trident
62
PSL Acetabular Shell (“acetabular shell” or “acetabular cup”).
After his surgery, plaintiff began experiencing pain in his thigh,
63
groin, and hip, which persisted for some time.
Plaintiff was
subsequently advised by his doctor that his pain was caused by a
64
failure in his hip prosthesis. Plaintiff asserted his pain was due to
loosening of the acetabular shell component of his hip prosthesis,
caused by residues that remained on the shell after manufacturing
65
and packaging.
“It [was] undisputed that the acetabular shell
received § 510(k) approval and was commercially available well
66
before [p]laintiff received his hip replacement.” The acetabular
shell was later incorporated into the Trident System, which
received premarket approval on or about February 3, 2003,
approximately three-and-a-half years before plaintiff received the
67
device.
Plaintiff sued defendant alleging manufacturing, design, and
68
Defendant
marketing defects in the acetabular shell.
subsequently moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, arguing they were
69
preempted under § 360k(a). In response, plaintiff contended his
claims were not preempted because the acetabular shell was not
part of the Trident System that was approved via the PMA process,
70
but instead was FDA-approved only through the § 510(k) process.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas disagreed, concluding instead that the Trident System

61. 724 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 652.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Specifically, plaintiff asserted claims for relief under strict liability,
negligence, and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. Plaintiff sought
actual and punitive damages. Id.
69. Id. at 652–53.
70. Id. at 654.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/4

12

Schultz and Aberson: Be Careful What You Ask For: The FDA's Denials of Citizen Petitio

2013]

FDA’S DENIALS OF CITIZEN PETITIONS

1169
71

approved through the PMA process included the acetabular shell.
The fact that the acetabular shell was previously approved through
the § 510(k) process did not affect the court’s analysis:
[T]hat the acetabular shell was previously approved
through only the § 510(k) process, and was commercially
available when the Trident System was approved, does not
change the fact that it was later subject to the more
rigorous scrutiny of the PMA process as a component of
the Trident System. Because the Trident System went
through the PMA process, and the acetabular shell was
part of this system, the first part of the Riegel test is
72
satisfied.
The district court also concluded that because the state law claims
alleged by plaintiff imposed requirements in addition to those
73
imposed by the MDA, they were preempted.
Accordingly, the
74
court dismissed plaintiff’s claims.
In Cornwell v. Stryker Corp., plaintiff filed claims against
defendant alleging defects in the Trident System’s acetabular shell
caused plaintiff pain and forced him to undergo a revision of his
75
total hip replacement. As in Lewkut, plaintiff contended that his
claims were not preempted because the acetabular cup component
of the Trident System was initially approved via the § 510(k)
76
process, not the PMA process. The United States District Court
for the District of Idaho rejected plaintiff’s argument, instead
concluding “the record in this case supports that the Trident
System, including its component parts, received PMA approval
77
under the PMA process.”
Accordingly, the court held that
78
plaintiff’s product liability claims were preempted.
The courts in Lewkut and Cornwell do not stand alone. In fact,
several other courts dealing with claims relating to the Trident
System have similarly held that when the system received premarket
approval, all of the device’s components, including the acetabular
79
shell, received premarket approval. This line of analysis is not
71. Id. at 656.
72. Id. at 657.
73. Id. at 660.
74. Id.
75. No. 1:10-cv-00066-EJL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116824, at *1–2 (D. Idaho
Nov. 1, 2010).
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id. at *8.
78. Id. at *9.
79. See, e.g., Gross v. Stryker Corp., 858 F. Supp. 2d 466, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2012)
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limited, however, to just those cases involving Stryker’s Trident
System. Indeed, courts in cases involving other medical devices
have similarly found that attempting to separate the component
parts of a medical device or system that has received premarket
80
approval for purposes of preemption is simply not appropriate.
VI. THE FDA’S DENIAL OF CITIZEN PETITIONS CONFIRMS THERE IS
NO SUCH THING AS A LIMITED PREMARKET APPROVAL
Not to be deterred, plaintiffs in Duggan v. Medtronic, Inc.
advanced the argument one step further, this time asking the FDA
to weigh in on the meaning of its PMA letter as it related to the
question of whether the FDA’s premarket approval of a Paradigm
Real Time System applied to all aspects and components of the
81
system.
On June 15, 1999, the FDA granted premarket approval to a
Medtronic medical device called the MiniMed Continuous Glucose
Monitoring System, a device that aids diabetics by monitoring
82
blood glucose levels. “[T]hrough a series of premarket approval
(“Trident System, in its entirety, received premarket approval.”); Bass v. Stryker
Corp., No. 4:09CV632Y, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90226, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31,
2010), aff’ d in part, rev’d in part, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1789 (5th Cir. Jan. 31,
2012) (holding defendant had established that the acetabular shell, as a
component of the Trident System, “was subject to the rigorous premarket-approval
review on which the Supreme Court’s analysis in Riegel was based, causing claims
based on the Shell to be preempted under § 360k(a)”); Lemelle v. Stryker
Orthopaedics, 698 F. Supp. 2d 668 (W.D. La. 2010) (dismissing state law product
liability claims against the Trident System, including those involving acetabular
shells); Funk v. Stryker Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“[I]n
nearly all of the prior district court cases addressing preemption of claims
involving the Trident, both the plaintiffs and the defendants agreed it was a Class
III device approved through the PMA process.”); Delaney v. Stryker Orthopaedics,
No. 08-03120, 2009 WL 564243, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2009) (noting that additional
discovery was not warranted because defendant had sufficiently demonstrated that
the entire Trident System underwent the PMA process); Bausch v. Stryker Corp.,
No. 08C4248, 2008 WL 5157940, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2008), rev’d, 630 F.3d 546
(7th Cir. 2010) (noting that Trident, including the acetabular shell, was subjected
to the process of premarket approval and therefore subject to federal regulations).
80. See, e.g., Bentzley v. Medtronic, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 443, 452 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (“Plaintiff’s contention that, in considering a preemption issue, the Court
must break a medical device into its component parts, is without legal support.”);
Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 780 (D. Minn. 2009) (“It makes no
sense—indeed, it would probably be impossible—to pick apart the components of
a medical device and apply different preemption analyses to different
components.”).
81. 840 F. Supp. 2d 466, 472 (D. Mass. 2012).
82. Id. at 469.
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supplements, this [glucose] sensor came to include a monitor to
display the data [obtained] from the sensor; Medtronic named the
83
device Guardian RT.”
Medtronic also marketed Model MMT515/715 insulin pumps, Class III medical devices that deliver
84
insulin to a patient either automatically or based on patient input.
The MMT-515/715 insulin pumps were approved in 2004 via the
85
§ 510(k) process.
Medtronic subsequently developed the Paradigm Real Time
System: a combination of the Guardian RT glucose monitor and
the next generation Model MMT-522/722 insulin pumps that
allowed the glucose sensor to send data to the pump for viewing on
86
the pump’s monitor.
The Paradigm Real Time System was
submitted to the FDA on October 4, 2005, as a supplement to the
prior PMA application for the MiniMed Continuous Glucose
87
Monitoring System. In its application, Medtronic described the
Paradigm Real Time System as an “integration of the 515/715
88
The supplemental PMA
pump with the Guardian RT.”
89
application was approved by the FDA on April 7, 2006.
Plaintiff Judith Duggan utilized a Medtronic Model MMT-522
90
Plaintiffs filed suit against
insulin pump to treat her diabetes.
defendant Medtronic claiming the insulin pump used by Ms.
91
Duggan was defective and caused her to suffer physical injuries.
Medtronic subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing
that, because the MMT-522 pump received premarket approval,
plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims were preempted by § 360k(a) of the
92
MDA.
Plaintiffs disagreed, instead contending that, while the
FDA granted premarket approval for certain components of the
Paradigm Real Time System, the FDA had not granted premarket
approval for the MMT-522 pump, the part of the system that

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 469–70.
87. Id. at 470.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 467. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, unfair and deceptive acts or practices in violation of
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, and loss of consortium. Id.
92. Id. at 468.
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93

allegedly injured Ms. Duggan. Plaintiffs argued that because the
MMT-522 pump was substantially identical to the MMT-515 pump,
which entered the market through the § 510(k) process, state law
claims specifically and exclusively targeting the insulin pump
94
component of the system should not be preempted.
“Acknowledging that when premarket approval is granted to a
system it applies to all devices within the system, [plaintiffs also
contended] the FDA did not approve the Paradigm [Real Time]
95
System as a system.” Finally, plaintiffs argued that the language in
the FDA approval letter for the Paradigm Real Time System shows
the FDA did not intend to grant premarket approval to the entire
96
system.
Interestingly, plaintiffs filed a citizen petition with the FDA
97
regarding the meaning of the premarket approval letter. But the
98
FDA denied plaintiffs’ petition.
In its letter denying plaintiffs’
citizen petition, the FDA made clear it intended to grant premarket
approval to the entire Paradigm Real Time System, including the
MMT-522 pump: “FDA approved the PMA supplement for the
Paradigm System, including both the 522 pump and the Guardian
99
RT sensor, on April 7, 2006.” The FDA further explained:
The approval reflected FDA’s finding that the PMA
supplement for the Paradigm System and the original
PMA for the Guardian RT sensor provided a reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness for the Paradigm
System. Because the approval letter, as issued, applies to
the Paradigm System as a whole, we deny your request to
amend the approval letter by adding the following
language: “This approval is limited solely to the ability of
the pump to accept data from the sensor and the ability
93. Id. at 471.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 472.
97. Id. Plaintiffs also filed a request for testimony with the FDA, which the
FDA denied, and issued a subpoena to the FDA for a deposition, which the FDA
moved to quash. Id. at 472 & n.1. In its memorandum in support of its motion to
quash, the FDA argued, in part, that complying with the subpoena would be
unduly burdensome because the FDA’s citizen petition response obviated
plaintiffs need for testimony regarding the scope and content of the approval
letter. Motion to Quash at 28, Duggan, 840 F. Supp. 2d 466 (No. 1:09-cv-12046).
Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their subpoena. Duggan, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 472
n.1.
98. Duggan, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
99. Id.
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for the sensor to communicate directly to the pump, and
100
this approval does not extend to the pump itself.”
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the Paradigm Real
Time System, including the MMT-522 pump, was granted
premarket approval, and plaintiffs’ state law claims were preempted
under the MDA; therefore, the court granted Medtronic’s motion
101
for summary judgment.
The FDA’s denial of plaintiffs’ citizen petition in Duggan is not
the only instance of that occurring with respect to Medtronic’s
Paradigm Real Time System. In Bentzley v. Medtronic, Inc., plaintiff
Paul Bentzley, who like Ms. Duggan utilized a Medtronic Model
MMT-522 insulin pump to treat his diabetes, filed a lawsuit after he
was hospitalized for diabetic ketoacidosis alleging that his insulin
102
pump malfunctioned.
Defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s MMT-522 pump received
premarket approval and that plaintiff’s claims were therefore
103
preempted by § 360k(a) of the MDA.
Plaintiff responded by
claiming, in part, that his MMT-522 pump was “separate and apart”
from the Paradigm Real Time System and thus was not approved
104
through the PMA process.
As in Duggan, plaintiff sought to bolster his claim by filing a
citizen petition with the FDA requesting clarification of the scope
of the FDA’s April 7, 2006 letter granting premarket approval of
105
the Paradigm Real Time System.
Specifically, plaintiff sought to
amend the letter by adding the exact same language suggested by
plaintiffs’ counsel in Duggan: “This approval is limited solely to the
ability of the pump to accept data from the sensor and the ability
for the sensor to communicate directly to the pump, and this

100. Citizen Petition Response Letter from Leslie Kux, Acting Assistant
Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Charles R. Houssiere, III, Senior Partner,
Houssiere, Durant & Houssiere, LLP, and Ralph D. McBride, Partner, Bracewell &
Giuliani LLP (Sept. 23, 2011) (on file with author).
101. Duggan, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 473. In doing so, the court observed: “To the
extent there was any ambiguity about the scope of the approval letter, this
rejection of the Citizen Petition is the cherry on the icing.” Id. at 472.
102. 827 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Specifically, plaintiff asserted
claims for strict liability, marketing defect, design defect, manufacturing defect,
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, negligence, and punitive
damages. Id.
103. Id. at 449.
104. Id. at 450, 451.
105. Id. at 451.
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106

approval does not extend to the pump itself.”
On September 23, 2011—the same day the FDA denied
plaintiff’s citizen petition in Duggan—the FDA responded by letter
107
and rejected plaintiff’s citizen petition.
Like the FDA’s letter to
Ms. Duggan’s counsel, the FDA first noted that “[t]he Paradigm
[Real Time] System consists of the Paradigm MMT-522/722
external insulin infusion pump (‘the 522 Pump’) and a continuous
108
The FDA further
glucose monitor, the Guardian RT sensor.”
observed that “Medtronic modified the 515 Pump and the
Guardian RT sensor and combined them to create the Paradigm
109
System.” The FDA’s letter concluded:
Accordingly, FDA approved the PMA supplement for the
Paradigm System, including both the 522 pump and the
Guardian RT sensor, on April 7, 2006. . . . Because the
approval letter, as issued, applies to the Paradigm System
as a whole, we deny [plaintiff’s] request to amend the
110
approval letter by adding the [suggested] language . . . .
Relying in part on the rejection of plaintiff’s citizen petition, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that the entire Paradigm Real Time System, including
111
plaintiff’s Model MMT-522 pump, received premarket approval.
The following principle can be gleaned from the FDA’s denials
of the citizen petitions in Duggan and Bentzley: the FDA’s grant of
premarket approval to a medical device or system applies to all
aspects and components of that device or system. This is consistent
with what courts have previously held, and means that state law
claims involving medical devices or systems receiving premarket
approval can only survive going forward if they are truly parallel
and do not impose different or additional requirements on the
device.

106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id. (citation omitted).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 451–52 (“Because the FDA granted premarket approval for the
MMT-522 System, the Court finds that the Federal Government has established
requirements applicable to the relevant device.”).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The FDA’s denials of the citizen petitions in Duggan and
Bentzley, along with recent judicial decisions consistently holding
that premarket approval of medical devices applies to all aspects
and components of the medical device system at issue, have likely
sounded the death knell for any future arguments by plaintiffs that
the FDA granted manufacturers limited premarket approvals that
do not apply to all aspects and components of a medical device or
system. Indeed, the only time such an argument would seem
appropriate is when the PMA letter itself clearly and expressly limits
the approval to only certain aspects or components of the medical
device or system. As a result, moving forward it seems likely the
future of medical device litigation, as it relates to the issue of
preemption, will be focused almost exclusively on the question of
whether the state claims being asserted by plaintiffs are parallel.
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